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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
.JOHN HELLSTROM, d/b/a DIESEL 
SERVICE COMP ANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
D. A. OSGUTHORPE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
11462 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a suit to collect for the repairs allegedly made 
on a truck engine. 
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT 
The lower court, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, 
.Judge, granted plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment on the repair bill and allowed interest and attor-
ney's fees without even considering the court file or the 
depositions upon which plaintiff's Motion was based. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the Summary Judt-,rinent 
and remand of tlw case for trial on the merits. 
STA'l'EMI~NT OF FACTS 
The defendant, D. A. Osgnthorpe, is the owner of 
a truck which is used in his ranehing and fanning bnsi-
nPss. The truck engine was in need of repair and he had 
Clarence Osguthorpe, an employee, deliwr tlw truck to 
plaintiff for an examination to determine the extPnt of 
repairs needed on the truck. The truck engine was par-
tially di~ms::wmhlPd and vlaintiff gaye defendant an t>sti-
mah•d repair cm;t of $1,800.00 to $1,900.00 and receivPd 
from defendant authority to proceed with the r<•pair' 
on that hasiR. In a connrsation thereafter plaintiff a<l-
Yised defendant that tlw r<'pairs would cost an additional 
$400.00 to $500.00, and h<' was told hy defendant to go 
ahead if this were tlw Pxtent of the eost (DPf Pnda11t'~ 
(l(•position pp. 10, 11 ). 
When th<, truck repairs w<'re eomplPt(•d in FPln·u~ll'Y, 
1967, Clarence Osgu thorpe picked tlw truck up from 
plaintiff and at that time sigrwd a hlank repair order 
form (R-29). Defendant subsequently stopped by plain-
tiff's shop to pick up the repair hill hut was told it ha<l 
not hPPn pr0pared (D<·fendant's d<>position p. 12). '!'he 
form was httPr filled in by employ<>es of plaintiff anrl 
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sent to defendant and he objected to the cost of repairs 
and also to the fact that the trnck was not performing 
properly (DefE>ndant's deposition p. 13). 
The trnck was subsequently returned for additional 
repairs in June, 1967, but still did not perform satisfac-
torily (R-31). Plaintiff subsequently paid $500.00 to 
plaintiff but at no time did the parties agree on any 
settled amount for the ·work (Defendant's deposition 
]J 17). 
Plaintiff commenced this suit on the repair bill,which 
was filled in by his employees without the knowledge 
or approval of dE>fendant and, in addition, he demanded 
attorney's fees and intE>rest. Defendant denied the au-
thority of Clarence Osguthorpe to bind him on any con-
tract providing for attorney's fees and interest (Defend-
ant's dqmsition p. 16) and also denied that the amount 
charged for the repairs was rE>asonable or that the 
amount claimE>d was within the cost limits agrE>ed to by 
!Jim (R - 5 & G). In addition, lw allege ..d that the repairs 
11t·re infrrior and not of a workmanlike quality (R-5). 
D(•positiom.; were tahn of tht> plaintiff, the defendant 
and ClarE>nce Osguthorpe. Tlwreafter plaintiff made a 
Motion for Summary Judgment based upon "the plead-
ings and the depositions of Clarence Osguthorpe, the 
plaintiff and the defendant" (R-26). After the hearing 
tlw motion was granted on the hasis of counsel's argu-
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rnent without any rt>fercnce whatever by the court to the 
pleadings or the depositions ( R-33). In fact, the deposi-
tion of Clarence OsguthoqJe, taken September 6, 1968, 
had not been filPd in tlw court ai1d is not evm a part 
of the r<'cord on appt>al. 
AHGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT THEREBY PRECLUDING 
DEFENDANT FROM PRESENTING HIS EVIDENCE 
AS TO GENUINE ISSUES AND MATERIAL FACTS 
IN DISPUTE. 
It is obvious from an examination of the pleading:-:. 
affidavits, and depositions on file that the lower conrt 
gavP no consideration whatever to the man~· factual i~­
snes present in this c>asP whieh should properly ht> n•-
:;;olnd hy a jury. 
'The :\iotion for Sunnuary .Jnd;..,rrm•nt was has(•d upon 
the "pleadings and the depositions of ClarPnct~ Osg11-
thorpe, the plaintiff and the defendant" (R-26). 'l'lw 
Sununary Judgment itself states that ''being fully in-
formed in the premises from the pleadings, the affidavits, 
tlw motions and the dPpositions of tlw vartiPs and of 
Clarence Osgnthorpe the Court finds the issues jn favor 
of the plaintiff, ... " (R-33). 
The above is stated in spite of the fact that the 
deposition of Clarence Osguthorpe was never presented 
to or considered by the Court. It was not received by 
the Clerk or the Court prior to, during, or after the argu-
ments on the Motion for Summary Judgment and has 
not been filed with the Clerk even to this date. It is 
not even a part of the record on appeal. Therefore, the 
record discloses the lower court could not have considered 
the contents of that deposition prior to granting its Sum-
mary J ndgment even though the Motion for Smmnary 
.Judgment was supposedly based upon that deposition. 
~loreover, as will hereafter appear, the lower court could 
not have given any consideration to the many issues set 
forth in tht' pleadings and depositions in granting the 
~nmmary Judgment. 
'11he Court in Thompson v. Ford Motor Company, 
14 Utah 2d 334, 284 P.2d 109 (1963), held that it was 
unable to consider the appeal on the merits since the 
dqwsitions in that cast' reached this Court in sealed 
('ll\'elopP:-; and were never marked and introduced into 
\'\ id<'nce nor rPad by the trial judge. In the present case 
tliP deposition of ClarencP O:o;guthorpe was never filed 
\rith the Court or tht' Cl(•rk and is not a part of the 
l'Peord on appeal, yet is relie<l upon in the Motion and 
tlw ~mrnnary Judgment. 
In addition to the lower court's obvious lack of dili-
gPnc•p in failure to consider the basis of the Motion as 
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noted above, it is clear from even a cursory analysis 
of the record that many genuine factual issues are raisPd 
hy the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions which pre-
clude the granting of a judgment as a matter of law b:-
tlw lm\·er comt. Plaintiff's .l\Iotion for Rummary Judg-
11wnt sets ont eleven numbered paragraphs containing 
\\-hat according to plaintiff are 
"material fach; ... without substantial contro-
versy and "rithout genuinl:' iss1w :" (R-2G) 
Plaintiff tlwn alleges that 
"From tlw foregoing facts plaintiff is entitled to 
jndgment as a matter of law as follows:" 
and lists seven numbered varagraphs containing the elr-
ments of the judgment (R-27). l\Iany of tlH.' so-callt>cl 
•·.facts" set forth by }Jlaintiff are in H'ality nothing but 
conclusions and allegations as to which tlwrP is a ge11ui1w 
i~Kll(' and tlw conclusions drawn tlwn•from are com-
plett•ly unsupportable as will be dvmonstratt>J in tlw 
rnrnill('red pragrnphs which follow: 
( 1) Orn· of tlw basic dispnkd factual issul's in 01i:-; 
cas<> is whdher the plaintiff and the defrnda11t PHI' 
n•ached a meeting of the minds concerning the cost of 
the total repairs and the authorization to proceed with 
repair of the trnck. Yet paragraph 4 of plaintiff's l\Io-
tion for Snmmary Judgment states that tlwre is no issue 
as to the fact that: 
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"There was no agreement between the parties that 
the repairs would be made at a specified price" 
(R-26). 
It is obvious from the depositions of the parties that 
there is a factual dispute as to what estimate was given 
for the cost of repairs and upon what basis authorization 
was given by defendant to proceed with repairs. 
Defendant stated that the original estimate for re-
pair was $1,800.00 to $1,900.00 and that subsequently he 
was advised by plaintiff the total repair would be an 
additional $400.00 to $500.00, but that it would not run 
lllore than that. It was upon this representation and 
agreement that the repair work was continued (Deposi-
tion of defendant, p. 11). 
Plaintiff claims the original estimate was $1,800.00 
to $2,000.00 (Deposition of plaintiff, p. 8), and that sub-
$t'qUPntly hE' told the def E>ndant it would cost "consider-
abl>· more" and by that he mE>ant $2,500.00 to $3,000.00, 
lint that no definite figures wE>re discussed (Deposition 
of plaintiff, P. 9 & 10). 
(2) Paragraph 5 of plaintiff's Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment states that there is no genuine issue 
of fact that 
"the agreement of the parties was that the work 
,,·ould he done at the reasonable cost and value 
8 
thereof with estimates of cost hy the plaintiff'' 
(R-2n). 
Defendant's answer dt>nies that tht> chargt> made for 
repairs was reasonable. Dl:'fendant stattid that the chal'gt> 
made by plaintiff for repairs was too high based on thP 
cost of similar repair work (D<>position of defendant. 
lJ. 18). 
Even though the issne as to reasonableness of a 
t·harge is traditionally a fact question, no affidavit or 
(•vidt"nce was introdnctid by plaintiff which would prow 
the total bill was rem;onahle. In this regard it is interest-
ing to note that at the same hearing at which the Sum-
mary Jndgnwnt was granted, the court upon defendant's 
motion ordered the plaintiff to furnish information con-
cerning plaintiff's markup of parts and outside work 
(H-:.20, 33). Plaintiff had refnsPd to disclose this infor-
mation on dt>position ( R-:.20) and the court granted tlw 
111otion of cleftindant heeausl' snch information was elParly 
rdevant in dPtPnnining what wa:;; a r<'asonahlP prie•'. 
This information, of course, was not lwfore the e011r: 
~:nd could not han' been considPn•d hy the court wlwn 
it grant<'d srnmnary jwlgnwnt. 
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that the work was tu 
he done "for the reasonable and agreed price of $2,784.57" 
(R-1). In plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judguwnt lw 
claims tlwrP was no agrPed price and that the "-ork wa~ 
to lw <lorn• at the "reasonable cost and vahw thNeof" 
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(R-26). Thus, plaintiff's own pleadings, motion and dep-
osition are inconsistent and by themselves create an 
issue of fact as to whether the price was agreed upon 
or was to be a reasonable price. 
(3) Paragraph 10 of plaintiff's Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment states that "the account was past due 
on no later than July 10, 1967" (R-27) and that there is 
no genuine issue as to this fact. 
'rhere is nothing on the repair order which estab-
lishes when the account becomes "past due" (Plaintiff's 
Exibit No. 1). Where the work has not been properly 
performed and the amount charged is unreasonable or 
in excess of the agreed price the time when payment is 
dne becomes a question of fact. 
"When' no time for the payment of an account 
has bPen fixed by express agreement, the pre-
sumed intention of th0 parties, to be ascertained 
from all the surrounding circumstances, including 
0sp0cially the character and natur0 of the account, 
the course of d0alings hetw0en the parti0s, and 
cnstom and nsage will control, and an account 
may, under varying circumstances, be due either 
imnwdiately or upon tlw expiration of a reason-
able time, or at a definite period ,or upon demand. 
However, it may be accPpted as a general rule that 
in the absence of any circumstances indicating a 
different intention an account is payable imme-
diately." l Am.Jur.2d, Accounts and Accounting 
~10. 
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In the vrtsent cas<' it is clear the paynwnt was not 
due immediately sine<' P\'Pn tht> plaintiff com·t>dPs it wa" 
not lJast dlw 11ni.il .Tnly 10 P\'Pn thongh tlw work was 
I>Prfor11wd in l;\--hrnar:1. ThP past d11e datP is a q11Pstinn 
0f fad to hP ddPrrninPd from all surrounding circrnu-
:;tanct>s, including thP com·sp of dPalings lwhwl'n tltP 
parti<>:-:. as to which th<>n' is nothing in thP rPcord. 
(-±) Paragraph Plt>wn of plaintiff's ~lotion for Sum-
mary .Tndg11wnt statPs that: 
··A n·a:-:onahl<· attorn<·~··s fp1• would lw thP 
mi11irnum <·stahlisl1Pd I»· th<· Salt Lah l 'onnt~· 
Bar for <'ol IPdion of nn:-:<>cmwl ac('o1mts." ( H-2i) 
'l'his assm1ws: (1) that a n·asonahh• attorrn•y's frp or 
nny attornl:'y's frp was agrt>Pd to hy the partiPs; (2) that 
an 1•mployt'<> ('an hind his 1•111ployt'r as a matt<'r of l:lll 
h~ signing a hlank doc11u1<·nt eontaining a small prinl1·d 
ti·rrn allowing for attorrn·~··s t'P<>s \\"l1<·n no oth<·r p01-
tions of t]w C'Ontraet Jia\'l' ]Wt'n fill<•<l ill, inC'ln<ling t]w 
pric<' and work dorn•; (:~) that th<' <>rnploy<'P had Sl\('lr 
a11tl10rit~-; arnl (-!) that th<· hlanks on th<> ('Ontraet wPn' 
i'illPd in h:» Iii<· plaintiff in aeeonlmH'<' wit\1 l1is aµ:n·1·· 
lll<'llt wit Ii tlw dPf<·n<lant. A 11 of t!1Ps1• matt" rs an· s1•ri-
011sl~· dispntNl hy the def Pndant. 
But even assuming all of tlw ahovP issllt-'8 \\'Pl'(· l'l:'-
solved against the dPfendant the fact still remains that 
what is rP1Hmnahle is sonwthing upon which rt>asonnh\ 1• 
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1ninds can diffor. The plaintiff offered no proof nor 
clirl he file an,\· affidavit in support of what was a reason-
nhlt> attom(•_y's fee in this ras<•. 
Tlw Court has recognizPd that what is a n•asonabh~ 
attornPy's fpp is a 4nestion of fact. Hatch v. S11gar-
lio11se Fin(t1/Cf' Company, 20 Utah 2d 156, 434 P.2d 758 
I J 9fi7). .J us tie!' l<~Jlett in his concurring opinion pointed 
ont that th<' statement that a f Pe is within the schedule 
:1ppl'O\'(•d Ji:· a bar a::;sociation is not sufficient wlH-'I"!' 
1:-osm·s are raisPd, since there rnnst still bP a detPnnina-
lioll a:-; to "·hat is rPasonahlP: 
"The eomt eannot evalnatP p,·idence on sum-
mary jndgHwnt, and at trial tlw court cannot fix 
an attorney's fpe t>xeept wlwre evidence has been 
introducf'<l on the matter or stipulation entered 
into by tlw partiPs as to hm\· the judge> may dPkr-
111int· it." 
( ;) ) 'l'hP plaintiff in his :Motion for Summar.'· Jndg-
1w·nt afti·r li:-;ting the <'lPvt>n nmnlwn•d paragraphs of 
:-11pposPdl:· uncontradich•d "facts," 'd1ich arP strongly 
1·11ntl·:-;h·d as notP<l h<>rt>in, tlwn statPs: 
"From tlw fon•going farts, plaintiff is entitlt>d 
to j11<lg11wnt as a mattPr of law, as follows:" 
( H-:21) 
Thi:-; allPgation is tht>n followed by sewn paragraphs of 
"IJlH"lnsions based upon disputed material facts which 
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are, as noted above and below, incapable of supporting 
the conclusions reached. 
(6) Plaintiff's first conclusion is that 
'"l1he balance of $2,291.32 is an agreed balance 
m the nature of an account stated." (R-27) 
An "af'C'onnt stated" is generally defined as: 
·'When the parties to an open account reacn 
an agreement with respPct to the totality of the 
transactions betwePn them, the new transaction is 
called a "statement" of the account, and the situa-
tion lwtween the parties is called an "account 
stated," -..d1ich may be broadly defined as an agree-
ment based upon prior transactions betw<>en thr 
parties, with respect to t1w correctness of tlw 
separate items composing t1H' account, and thr 
balance, if an:·, in favor of the onP or the othl'r." 
1 Am .. Jnr.2d, Af'cotmts and AC'cotmting, ~21. 
Tlwre has h<'en no agn•<•mPnt hPtwePn the defendant 
and iilaintiff as to thP amount due and O\Ving for th~ 
n•pair of thP PnginP. In fact, then" is an oh-..'ions conflict 
of evidenCl' on this vt->ry issu<> from the plPadings and 
depositions herein. 
"'T'he primary question in an action on an 
aceount stated is whether both parties intended 
the transaction to beconw a full and final settle-
ment of the entire indehtPdness represent('d tlwre-
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hy, and this q1wstion is detenninrd from all the 
circumstances of the case. If tlw Pvidence is ron-
flirting, the question is one of fact for the jury 
upon propPr instruction from the court." 1 Arn . 
. Jnr.2d, Accounts and Accounting, ~42. 
The testimony of the plaintiff and the defendant 
l\J'(' in conflict as to the amount agreed to be paid for 
repairs and as to the reasonable value for services per-
formed. This is a question which must be determined 
hy a jnry in light of all of thr circumstances of the case. 
If it is the contention of the plaintiff that silence 
on the part of the defendant amounted to an acceptance 
of an "account stated," such silence ,if in fact it did exist, 
which defendant strenuously denies, would amount only 
to an inference at most which is not conclusive and which 
i' snbject to being rehutti>d. 1 Am.Jur.2d. Accounts and 
.\f'ro1mting, ~:30. 
(I) Plaintiff's sPcond conclusion 1s that 
'"l'he work has hePn a<·eepted h!· the defendant 
and th<'r<' has ht><>n no complaint and no request 
!'or furtlH·r H'n·i<'P s11hs<'q11ent to .JunP, 19G7." 
ilk!.'~) 
This supposed "fact" is directly contradicted in the 
(lt·position of the defendant (p. 18) in which he states 
thu truck was not vroperly repaired but was not taken 
back to the plaintiff dnfl to the treatment which defE>nd-
14 
ant had received. Also, th<> dPposition of Clarenc<' Osgu-
thorpe, not a part of the rPcord herein, directly contra-
dicts the above conclusion. The third defense as set 
forth in the Answer of tlw def Pndant (R-5) alleges that 
the repairs were performed by plaintiff in an inferior 
manner. The amount owed has always been in dispute. 
(8) Plaintiff further states as a supposed conclu-
sion that 
"Defendant's agent bound the defendant to 
the agreement on plaintiff's invoice by which de-
f<'ndant became hound to pay 10 percent interest 
from the due date of the bill and a rPasonablP 
attornPy's fr<'.'' (R-~8) 
Snch a conclusion is hmwd upon the assumption (l) 
that Clarence Osguthorpe had the authority to sign an 
agrePment which would he binding upon te defendant, 
(2) that such authority included power to bind defrndant 
to pa~- attorney's fres and intl'rPst of an amount not yl'l 
arrived at and upon a contract ·which had not yet lwen 
complPted, and (:3) that plaintiff had the authorit.v of 
d<>fendant to draft sueh a contract and to fill in tlH' tern1' 
as he did. 
There is nothing in the record which would indicat(' 
the scope of Clarence Osguthorpe's authority to hind tlw 
defendant. The defendant in his deposition (p. 15) a~­
nies that his <>mployee had such authority. All of the 
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negotiation concerning the estimate, the authority to pro-
<'Pt>d, and all related matters had been a matter of discus-
,i)d>n between the defendant and the plaintiff, and Clar-
enee Osgnthorpe was not a party to thesf' discussions. 
The existencP of an agency relationship and the scope 
of an agent's authority is a fact issuP which is in dispute. 
Thl'n' is no Pvidence on the scope of Clarence Osgu-
thorpP's authority and whPther it extended beyond merely 
picking np tlH' trnek. 
Plaintiff did not han• anthorit>- to fill in the blanks 
of tlw repair order which was signed by Clarence Osgn-
thoqw so as to be binding upon the defendant. Clarence 
(1s;.,111thoqw states in paragraph S of his affidavit (R-30) 
tliat 
"Neither the plaintiff nor any of his agents, 
1·mployPes or SPITants whatsoever \YPre author-
ized or given 1wrmission to fill in, snbseq1wnt to 
affianfs signing his signatmP, tlw aforesaid blank 
spae1•s ]H'O\·id<~d for dollar amounts npon said 
donn1H•nt. '' 
.\ t tltl' tinw ( 'lar<>ncP Osgnthorpe sig1wd the doeu-
1111·nt thl'n· \\'1•n• no numerieal fignrPs in thP column 
lllarked "amount" nor was there any writing upon the 
l'ight-hand portion of the document marked "instruc-
i 1on~," nor any writing on the lower right-hand corner 
iii thP doennwnt mark<><l ''maehin<> works," nor were there 
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any dollar amounts in thl:' lower right-hand corner of 
the document specifying the total amounts for work per-
formed and parts furnished or for the total amount due 
(R-30). 
There is a disputed fact as to what occmred at 
the time Clarence Osgnthor1)e signed the blank repair 
order and as to what transpired there. The plaintiff 
in his deposition (p. 14), claims he was not present at ! 
the time Clarence Osguthorpe picked up the truck and 
had no kno\vledge concerning the writings contained on 
plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1. He claims this was all handled 
by people in his employ and that he does not know who 
was prl:'sent when the trnck was picked np but that it was 
after his bookkeeper had left for the day (Plaintiff':; 
deposition p. 24). 
Plaintiff in his deposition (p. 28) stated it was gen-
erally the practice to obtain the signature of a customer 
on tlw repair order authorizing plaintiff to proceed with 
repairs. In the present case, this authorization was nnl 
obtained in writing but the repairs were commenced upon 
the verbal agreement lwtwPl:'n the plaintiff, and the dv-
fendant and the writing as prepan'd hy plaintiff dol's not 
represPnt the agreement of the partiPs. 
There is no evidence that Clarence Osguthorpe had 
the authority to enter into any contract for and on behalf 
of the defendant. Even if he were so authorized there is 
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a question of fact as to whether the terms as placed in 
that contract by the plaintiff and the amounts set forth 
therein were in accordance with the agreement between 
the parties and within the authority of the plaintiff. 
The printed provisions of the repair order were 
1wv0r a part of the agreement reached between the par-
ties. The printed portion is an authorization to proceed 
with the repair work, but at the time it was signed by 
Clarence Osgnthorpe, who was not a party to the agree-
11wnt, and the work had already been completed. 
In order to determine whether the written contract 
('mbodi<'d fop agreement of the parties it is nececssaxy 
to determine what the parties had agreed to orally. This 
was not ewn considered by the lower court, and right-
fnll~' so since it is a quf'stion of fact for tlw jnry to 
l'!'~OIVP. 
The attitude of this Court toward summary judg-
nwnts has lwen set forth in many decisions. Indeed, one 
i1onders whether the granting of this drastic rem<>dy 
has <'lirninatf'd as much legal procedure as it has spawned. 
In Tengren v. Ingalls, 12 Utah 2d 388, 367 P.2d 179 
(1961), this Court stated at page 184: 
"The sustaining of summary motions without 
affording the party an opportunity to present his 
JS 
evidence is a Rtringent measure ·which courts 
should be rPluctant to grant. It should be borne in 
mind that although disposing of a case on 8ueh 
a motion ma>' seem an eas>' and expeditions meth-
od of dealing with litigation, it may not in fad 
be so. Unless the court feels a high degree of 
assurance that such ruling is correct, it may rt>snlt 
in defeating that pnrpose and actually protract-
ing the litigation by requiring an ap1)eal and then 
having a trial which should have been had in the 
first place. Accordingly, the privilege of 1m;sent-
ing evidence should be denied only when, taking 
the view most favorable to the parties' claims, lH· 
could not in any event establish a right to redrPs:-: 
under the lmv; and unless it clearly so appears, 
doubts should be resolnd in favor of iwnnitting 
. him to go to trial." · · 
SPe-aiso Kid11ia11 v. Whitr, 14 Utah 2d 142, 37~ P.2d 
s98 (19G3) where the conrt said at page 900: 
"In confronting the prohlPm presented on this 
appeal, we have heE>n obliged to remain aware that 
a summary judgment, which turns a part~· out of 
court without an opportnnity to presPnt his 1•Yi-
<lenc<>, i::-; a harsh mc'asnre that should lw grantt>d 
only wlwn, taking tlw viPw most favorabl<· to tlw 
partiPs' claims and any proof that might 1n·opPrl1 
he adduced thereunder, he could in no Pwnt JllT 
vail. That both parties hereto make plausible in 
their favor that reasonable minds could not s0r it 
the other way is a pointed commentary of the 
ability of the human mind to rationalize in its own 
intert>st. It is equally so npon the desirability and 
propriety of resolving any doubts in favor of lwr-
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mitting courts and juries to settle such disputes 
rather than ruling upon them summarily as "'as 
done here." 
In Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 
P.2d 266 (1962), which involved an action for a broker's 
commission on the sale of stock, the court stated at 
uage 268: 
''To sustain a summary judgment, the plead-
ings, evidence, admissions and inferences there-
from, viewed most favorably to the loser, must 
show that there is no genuine issue of material 
fact, and that the winner is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. Such showing must preclude, 
as a matter of law, all reasonable possibility that 
thP lo~er could win if given a trial." 
The court went on to point ont that where there 
an• cornplica ttid legal issues presented tiven when there 
i> nothing in the record to indicate that other evidence 
would he adduced, it is a "wise policy for the trial court 
to deny ~rnmmary judgment" and determine the issues 
l1y trial. 
CONCLF8101\ 
WlH·n YrPwmp; tlw facts most favorahk' to the de-
fondant, it is obvious that the facts of this case are not 
'llch as would require all reasonable minds to conclude 
that thl:'re was an agreement and acceptance of the bill 
and thf' work as performed by the plaintiff and of the 
attorne:1's f<>es and intPrest as lffovided on tlw repair 
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order. Whether all of the circnmstaneces and facts in thi~ 
case lead to that conclusion is a question of fact for thP 
JUry. 
Def Pndant has not had his day in court. He has not 
had an opportunity to present his case. There are glaring 
issues concerning material facts which are in disputP 
and which must be resolved before any court could reason-
a hly reach a decision in this case. 
11hat the lower court in this case should grant s1w1-
mary judgment on the basis of counsel's brief argument 
in view of the numerous disputed issues is difficult to 
understand. That the lower court should do so without 
even considering the pleadings or depositions upon which 
the summary judgment was specifically based, is, to put 
it mildly, incredible. 
The summary judgment should be 1·eversed and the 
case n~manded for trial on tlw issuPs. 
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